


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# INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF ART.

BY

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## INTRODUCTION.

It was Baumgarten (1750)<sup>1</sup> who first used the term *Aesthetica* to designate a separate and independent branch in philosophy, that of the philosophy of art. In the works of thinkers preceding him, we find only fragmentary opinions on art and beauty; and

<sup>1</sup> Baumgarten, *Aesthetica* (1750). See Bosanquet, *A History of Aesthetic*, New York, Macmillan, 1904, p. 182.

these more or less coherent notions were subordinated to speculations on religion and ethics. A systematic theory of art and beauty, in the philosophical sense of the term, did not exist as yet. In fact, Baumgarten in the introduction to his *Aesthetica* apologizes for spending his time on such a seemingly undignified task as establishing a system of the philosophy of art.

Baumgarten's philosophy of art is based upon the recognition of "obscure ideas." These "obscure ideas," which precede "clear ideas," do not belong to the sphere of logic, and require an entirely different treatment. While "clear ideas" are *truths known*, "obscure ideas" are *truths only felt*. The apprehension of clear ideas culminates in the true, while the true that discloses itself to us through our obscure ideas is the beautiful. This fundamental conception called the beautiful opened a new region for reflective speculation; and furthermore gave it philosophical import, which hitherto it had lacked.

No sooner was the road to this region opened by Baumgarten than a whole army of writers invaded the new field, attempting problems and advancing theories in the realm of art and the beautiful. Philosophers, scientists, poets, artists, and critics busied themselves to expound the fundamental principles of "aesthetics." The different vocations of these respective writers caused a diversity of opinion simply amazing; in fact, there is not another branch of human inquiry where opinions differ so widely, and where conceptions of the fundamental principles are so inconsistent and contradictory. This deplorable condition is the natural consequence of the fact that art and beauty have been treated from so many isolated points of view and the problems of aesthetics discussed on such radically divergent bases. The misunderstanding and misuse of the term "aesthetics" added another obstacle in the way of clearing up the fundamental principles of art and beauty: Every student of aesthetics must realize the incongruities which arise from the indiscriminating use of the name "aesthetics." To-day, when every essay, treatise, investigation, and criticism in the field of art and beauty is classed under aesthetics, the real meaning of Baumgarten's *aesthetica* is quite obliterated. With Baumgarten, *aesthetica* meant distinctly the philosophical investigation of "obscure ideas," or the



beautiful, while at the present time the name "aesthetics" is misleading; for it is also used to designate the scientific and historical treatment, and even the professional study, of art and beauty. If we consider the name "aesthetics" to cover the entire field of investigation concerning art and beauty, we certainly shall have to acknowledge the necessity of a systematic division of that field, in order to discuss its problems intelligently and from the needed definite point of view.

The division which naturally suggests itself in this case, is that into the science of aesthetics, on the one hand, and the philosophy of aesthetics, on the other. The science of aesthetics deals with the problems of beauty and art as they appear in nature; it analyzes the facts into their elements, and investigates the laws of their combinations and relations. The philosophy of aesthetics searches for the essence of art and beauty, and thus defines the place that art and beauty hold in the universe; in other words, it establishes the relation of art and beauty to the whole of reality. Hence it is evident that the problems of the philosophy of aesthetics differ widely from those of the science of aesthetics, so that it is a grave error to argue problems belonging to the philosophy of aesthetics upon a scientific basis; and *vice versa*. It will add greatly to the clarity and the precise understanding of every question in aesthetics if we keep in mind that science cannot invade the territory of philosophy, and that philosophy, on the other hand, should not interfere with scientific investigation.

Most of our prevalent theories of art and beauty labor under a confusion from neglecting this distinction. Scientific investigation, alone, cannot lead us to first causes; and, on the other hand, knowledge of the cause is not sufficient to give us knowledge about its effects. Aristotle's theory<sup>2</sup> of poetry and drama, for example, is thoroughly scientific and has great value in the science of aesthetics; but we should be in error if we gave it any philosophic import, for it does not and cannot answer the questions, What is art—is it essential or accidental to mankind, and what purpose does it fulfill in human life? Only the philosophy of aesthetics can answer these and similar questions.

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<sup>2</sup> Döring, *Die Kunstlehre des Aristoteles*, Jena, 1870.

Many writers on aesthetics hold that the study of the artistic activities and art-appreciation of the earlier peoples and savages will lead us to the knowledge of the fundamental principle of aesthetics. These writers, in my estimation, miss their point; just as the evolutionists do, in arguing the first principle on the basis of evolution.

Another class of writers holds that pain-pleasure is the fundamental principle of art and beauty. But we can see at once that such a variable phenomenon as pain-pleasure cannot serve as an unchangeable basis for the essential principle of aesthetics. It is true that pain-pleasure appears at every phase of artistic activity and art-appreciation, but it is also true that it appears in all other activities of the human individual, and so it is not sufficient to distinguish art from the other human interests. The meagerness and insufficiency of the pain-pleasure theory, as the fundamental principle of art and beauty, manifests itself at the outset. What *kind* of pain-pleasure is the aesthetic? and what differentiates it from the pain-pleasure phases of other activities? Marshall's answer to this question is erroneous, in my judgment.<sup>3</sup> He discriminates between aesthetic pleasure, and pleasure of another kind, on the ground that aesthetic pleasure remains such at its revival. But there are pleasures which in revival will remain pleasurable and which still were not aesthetic in the original experience, and will not be such in revival. For example, sexual pleasures; or the reminiscence of some other bodily pleasure. On the other hand, the pleasure of an aesthetic experience can lose its pleasurableness in revival and still remain aesthetic; for example, the comic. Furthermore, there are innumerable aesthetic experiences which are connected with pain, and become pleasurable only at their revival; for instance, the tragic. The only answer that remains for the pain-pleasure theorists would be, that the fundamental principle of art and beauty is the aesthetic pain-pleasure. But this is to have the question, What is the aesthetic? still to settle.

The physiological theory of Grant Allen,<sup>4</sup> though valuable enough, can be accredited only from a scientific standpoint; as a

<sup>3</sup> Marshall, *Pain, Pleasure and Aesthetics*, New York, Macmillan, 1894.

<sup>4</sup> Grant Allen, *Physiological Aesthetics*, New York, D. Appleton, 1877.



basis for the philosophy of art it is entirely inadequate. It is an exposition of pain-pleasure on physiological principles. But, as was just now shown, pain-pleasure as a sufficient explanation of the aesthetic, must be disallowed.

Similarly, environment, geographical and political conditions, cannot be seriously considered as a sufficient principle of art and beauty. We must admit that they all do influence the development of art, modify the creations of art; but they are not the real causes from which art springs. The same is true of civilization and culture.

The views of the psychologists on aesthetics are also scientific rather than philosophical. They start out to build up theories of art from a psychological phenomenon, without any philosophical warrant as to their solidity as fundamental principles in art. Schiller's "play-impulse,"<sup>5</sup> Hirn's "art-instinct,"<sup>6</sup> Groos's "play of man," or the "instinct of make-believe,"<sup>7</sup> all have partial truths in them, but do not give us satisfactory information of the essence of art and beauty; and though they contain many valuable suggestions of how art appears to us, and how art looked in its earlier stages in the temporal series, they leave us ignorant of what art really is.

Among the metaphysical explanations of art, too, we are unable to find an adequate account of art and beauty. Kant's "disinterested enjoyment" and "purposiveness without a purpose,"<sup>8</sup> and Goethe's "characteristic,"<sup>9</sup> are more or less universal traits of artistic activities and aesthetic appreciation, but are not their real causes. Kant's view of art and beauty as the link between theoretical and practical reason<sup>10</sup> is a definition from effect; but what we are looking for is a *causal* definition, for only a causal definition will tell us explicitly what art is. Hegel in his *Aesthetics*<sup>11</sup> calls the beautiful the idea in concrete form;

<sup>5</sup> Schiller, *Briefe über Aesthetische Erziehung*, 15, 26, 27 (Werke, vol. 12), Stuttgart, 1867-1876.

<sup>6</sup> Hirn, *The Origin of Art*, New York, Macmillan, 1900.

<sup>7</sup> Groos, *The Play of Man*, New York, D. Appleton, 1897.

<sup>8</sup> Kant, *Beobachtungen über das Gefühl des Schönen und des Erhabenen* (Werke, vol. 2), Leipzig, 1867-8.

<sup>9</sup> Goethe, *Deutsche Baukunst* (Werke, vol. 31), Stuttgart, 1840.

<sup>10</sup> Kant, *Kritik der Urtheilskraft* (Werke, vol. 5).

<sup>11</sup> Hegel, *Aesthetic* (1835). See Bosanquet, p. 334.

art then must be the expression of the idea in material substance. The weakness of this position is apparent when we try to push the argument to its limit. For then the absolute beautiful would be the absolute idea in absolute or perfect concrete form. But what is this absolute idea in absolute form? It can be nothing other than the Universe; and the expression of the Universe as absolute beauty would be the highest and most perfect art; but this might just as rightly be called the absolute reality, or the absolute excellence. And consequently we have gone back to Plato, with whom the difference between the beautiful, the true, and the good is entirely abolished, and all merge into the one idea, each without any characteristic of its own. The fault lies in Hegel's monistic philosophy, according to which aesthetics, like ethics, loses its identity in the all-embracing One, which is Logic purely.

The inconsistency of the prevalent aesthetic theories would become more manifest if we had time to examine in detail the various definitions of the beautiful. In the present paper, however, we must be satisfied with a general consideration of the prevalent definitions. According to Bosanquet:<sup>12</sup> "There is no definition of beauty that can be said to have met with universal acceptance. \* \* \* The definition should be either purely analytic of contents accepted as beautiful—purely metaphysical, if we like to call it so—or the purely psychological. To introduce a psychological differentia into a metaphysical definition is to introduce a factor which we cannot control, because the differentia so introduced is itself in need of analysis." To this I wish only to add that it is not simply because writers confound psychological, metaphysical, and historical data in their definition of the beautiful that the definition of beauty does not meet with universal acceptance. What we need is a *causal* definition, in order to have an adequate definition of the beautiful. Philosophy alone can give us the proper definition; psychological, physiological, or historical definitions are mere descriptions, without any information about the *essence* of the beautiful.

Another obstacle in the way of a clear definition, explanation, or even a complete description of art and beauty is found in the

<sup>12</sup> Bosanquet, *A History of Aesthetic*, New York, Macmillan, 1904, pp. 4 and 7.

use of the words "art" and "beauty" as synonyms. It is again the business of philosophy, more specially of the philosophy of art, to discriminate between art and beauty; and, furthermore, to establish the relation that subsists between them.

The problem before us involves the fundamental questions: "What is the beautiful?" and, subsequently, "What is art?" Our method of procedure must be both analytic and synthetic. Analytic, in order to find out how beauty manifests itself in human experience, and what the spring of artistic activity and art-appreciation is in mankind; synthetic, in order to establish a comprehensive and adequate theory, by which one may hope to determine what beauty and art are, and what place they occupy in the world of reality.

## I.

### THE FACULTIES OF THE HUMAN MIND.

In a philosophical investigation the first step taken is of the utmost importance. Dogmatism, prejudice, and bias must be eliminated. Our speculations must be based upon truths, which are not only corroborated by phenomena of our actual experience, but which in themselves defy contradiction. In our present investigation we have to consider art-activities on the one hand and art-appreciation on the other. That these things do exist, is an undeniable truth. Whether they exist for only a few or for more makes no material difference in our investigation. In order to fortify our position, let us be more critical and consider where art-activities and art-appreciation do undeniably exist. We safely can answer that they undeniably exist only among human beings. It is not pertinent to my present purpose to attempt to settle the question whether there is, or is not, any art-activity or art-appreciation in any other being but the human. But as both art-activity and art-appreciation unmistakably do exist in the human being, and are still in question for other beings, the human mind must be the object of our investigation.

To the observer the human mind reveals its identity through two different though not separate factors. These factors are

thinking and feeling. In every moment of our consciousness these two factors constitute an undissolved unity, analogous to a chemical compound, as in every function of the thinking there is some feeling present, while, *vice versa*, there can be no feeling without a thinking element in it. Curiously enough, this unity of thinking and feeling also discloses the characteristic attribute of a physical complex; it retains the identity of its constituent elements. The consciousness of the continuous activity and interactivity of the two factors is called self-consciousness. Each of these factors may occupy the predominant place in consciousness and thus determine the state of mind of the individual. It must not, however, be forgotten that, though our mental state is determined by either of the factors, predominantly present, the other factor will never be totally absent. This naturally follows, as we shall point out later, from the way reason is incarnated in the human body. The faculties of thinking and feeling, ever active, are the properties of the self alone, or the self in its internal (or private) being. They reveal only the consciousness of the ego to the ego; in other words, they reveal self-consciousness through introspection. But self-consciousness is only a part of the individual's mental life. The consciousness of his surroundings, environment, and furthermore, his relation to the other selves, must also be taken into consideration. The individual can not be looked upon as an isolated unit, but must be taken as he really is, living in the physical world and in the society of other individuals, all constituting together the cosmic order. In this capacity the human mind discloses another factor, which is the property of the individual as a member of the physical world. This factor also enters into the close union of the previously mentioned factors, and besides entering into a unitary complex with the faculties of thinking and feeling, it also retains its own characteristics. This factor, which is the social factor, is called expression. Expression reveals the individual's consciousness of his surroundings and environment to the other selves, through observation and experiment.

Before proceeding with the examination of the three above-mentioned faculties, we must consider the following facts:

1. The human mind, being reason incarnated in the human body, is necessarily a limited intelligence. By limited intelligence I do not mean to advocate agnosticism. The limitation of intelligence in the human mind means that it needs something more than pure intelligence, rather than something less, in order to be what it is. Besides the faculty of thinking, the human being must possess the faculty of feeling, and, as a social being, he must possess the faculty of expression. Though a limited intelligence, the human mind, by virtue of its reason, has the natural tendency to rise above its limitation, not by casting it off, but by using it as the means to an end. The end is reason itself, in the shape of understanding and knowledge. To attain this end, the human mind can and does avail itself of all its faculties—thinking, feeling, and expression.

2. The faculties of thinking and feeling, which are individual and personal, result in inward activities. The faculty of expression, on the other hand, which is social, results in outward activity. The activities of thinking and feeling are not perceptible to the other selves, even though their contents should belong to the physical world. Expression, being an outward activity, is perceptible, even if it contains thought or feeling, and it is always social, in fact, the only medium of communication for the individual.

3. The faculties of thinking and feeling may appear in consciousness with a tendency to reduce the intensity of one or the other, or to force one or the other out of consciousness entirely. Deep thought makes us forget our feeling; whereas very intense feeling will not admit much thinking. This is not the case with the faculty of expression. The faculty of expression seems to work hand in hand with both thinking and feeling. Whether thinking or feeling has the predominant place in consciousness, expression will not tend to force them out of consciousness, but it will act conjointly and in sympathy with the faculty which is determining the actual state of mind.

4. The interrelation of thinking and feeling is responsible for activities of a certain kind. In these activities, or rather interactivities, the faculties act upon one another. The interaction gives rise to volition.

The investigation of the faculty of thinking belongs to logic. The volitional acts, or conduct and behavior, are treated in ethics. The special study of expression and communication belongs to the special branches of science, according to what we wish to express or communicate. Thus the study of the expression and communication of thought belongs to the sphere of language, to grammar and rhetoric. The intelligent expression of our volition is a part of the study of history—manners, customs, natural or conventional. In none of these branches of human knowledge can we find a proper clue to a safe procedure in determining the fundamental principles of art and beauty.

Feeling is the only factor that remains for us to investigate if we can hope to solve our problem.

What the term "feeling" means, we all understand. Or, more correctly, we have all learned what feeling is through our faculty of feeling. (The common use of the term "feeling," to designate tactual sensations, is excluded from our present employment of it.) Very much has been said about feeling since Aristotle's time, but very little progress has been made in clearing up its fundamental principle. The reason of this is that feeling has always been treated one-sidedly, either as a mental faculty only, or else as solely a physiological phenomenon. Even the current theory of mental and physiological parallelism is inadequate, because it makes a mechanical device of the human individual, which he certainly is not. The body of a human being may be a very fine and subtle mechanism, but the consciousness in him is surely not the work of a mechanical implement. In the prevalent theories of feeling, the fundamental question, "Is feeling the property of mind or of body?" cannot be satisfactorily answered, because neither the mind by itself, nor the body by itself, possesses any property that we could call feeling. That the body, *qua* body, is void of any feeling, does not need of much demonstration. In an unconscious state we do not feel. There are innumerable examples in modern surgery to prove this fact; and the body from which consciousness has departed at death is certainly without any feeling whatever. The other alternative, that the mind, soul, or whatever we may choose to call it, has no feeling in its pure state, can easily be proved logically.

Volition, as we mentioned before, is the result of the interaction of thinking and feeling. Feeling, in other words, must be present if there is to be volition, or will. Under the term "will" as it is used here, I understand not only the acts of deliberate choice, but also the impulsive acts, whether they are controllable or not. The term "will" includes even that state of mind in which the actualization of our will is made impossible by some kind of inhibition, and appears in consciousness only as a very intense feeling like anxiety or desire. All of these mental states I include under "will," and they all are subjects of modification, according to the interaction of thought and feeling. Reflex action, pre-eminently, has feeling for its *motive*, and then will appears as an unconscious and uncontrollable expression of the feeling; we certainly may become conscious of such an expression after the action is over. Impulsive actions, conscious in every case, controllable or uncontrollable, are the expressions of will aroused by feeling, with more of the element of thought in them. Finally, when thought is the predominant factor in consciousness, the expression will result in a voluntary act of free choice, or in free will. It must not be forgotten, however, that feeling is and must be present in the mental state. Any phase of the will, in fact, has its germ in the interaction of thinking and feeling; eliminate feeling from the human mind and you surely will destroy the *sine qua non* of any act of will.

It is self-evident that feeling, which precedes will, may appear in either positive or negative form. It may be in harmony or in discord with the faculty of thinking. For example, I may feel an aversion to doing something, but after reasoning I may decide to do it; on the other hand, I may feel an inclination or even have a passion for something, and through reasoning my will may not effect an actual gratification of either. Feeling, in each case, must be present. Volition, actualized or in the form of wish or longing, will be determined, so far as its direction is concerned, by the element which is contributed by the faculty of thought, but in its essence it is feeling, of more or less intensity.

After these considerations, it is easy to see that if we can show "pure intelligence," "pure mind," "pure reason" or



whatever else "pure" we choose to call the spiritual element in our being, to be void of "will" in any shape, then necessarily it must be void of feeling also; because pure intelligence is perfect in itself, and if it has feeling, it must have the perfection of it. This perfection must include all phases and degrees of feeling, consequently must include will, from its unconscious reflex actualization up to the volitional act of free choice. That this is not the case is self-evident. Free choice can only be conceivable if there are alternatives to choose between. Pure intelligence cannot have alternatives; it *knows*, it thinks *only one way*, the *right way*, just because it is pure reason. It is also evident that pure intelligence must be void of those phases of "will" in which reason is not the principal element; as, for example, impulsive and instinctive activities. Lastly, the will, which on account of some inhibition, comes into consciousness only in the shape of more or less intense wish or longing, is incompatible with our conception of pure intelligence; first, because no inhibition can be spoken of in the case of pure intelligence; secondly, because wish or longing, which both imply want, in themselves contradict pure intelligence. Feeling, then, is not the property of pure intelligence (mind, or soul, without the body); and we also saw that the body, *qua* body (body without a soul, lifeless body), has no property of feeling. There remains the only alternative, that feeling is the property of limited intelligence, as such. In other words, it is the property of the incarnate soul.

The human individual is a union, somewhat analogous to chemical union, of the spiritual and the physical. Analogous to the chemical, because there is not a particle of the human body that is not permeated by reason, and, on the other hand, no act of human reason that is not intermixed with the physical element. The two elements, mental and physical, when thus intermixed by a *quasi*-chemism in the human being, modify each other's properties. The mind is limited through incarnation and loses its purity and perfection. The physical element, the body, loses its inert character and becomes alive through incarnation. But that is not all. This *quasi*-chemical unit (incarnate mind) gains through incarnation another attribute, an attribute belonging to neither of the elements, but peculiarly

its own. This added attribute of the human mind is the faculty of feeling. Under the term "feeling," then, I understand that factor in human consciousness which arises from the union of soul and body. In other words, mind, when in a limited condition, as in the human being, becomes conscious of that limitation through a new resultant factor that could not belong to it apart from embodiment. It follows that the whole field of human consciousness must contain a feeling-tone of some kind. Our mental, as well as our physical, activities are accompanied by a certain kind and degree of feeling.

This theory explains, furthermore, why feeling, though a single and unitary phenomenon, is never a simple one, but is always complex. The most primitive feeling, as pleasure or pain, must have both its mental and its physical element. There could be no feeling in pure mind, and there is no feeling in the lifeless body. Feeling can only appear when the two elements are in that perfect *quasi*-chemical union. Feeling, as the characteristic attribute of embodied intelligence, must also be a main factor in all activities belonging to the human mind. The activities to which I refer are preëminently expression and communication, and the volitional activities. Volitional activities we assigned previously to ethics. Here we shall have to consider "communication and expression." Expression and communication are the only possible ways for a human mind to reveal itself to others. Expression and communication are the means whereby other human selves make themselves known to us. A human being, as primordially a social being, must necessarily become conscious not only of himself, but of the society he lives in. He will become so after he has learned the meanings, natural or conventional, of the expressions of his fellow-beings. But in the process he also discloses his own being to all the others. He does so because of what he is, and not by any accident. What does the individual express and communicate? The human mind can express only itself, *i.e.*, its thought, its feeling and its will. These three powers really provide for all our possible impressions of the world outside of us, all our inward activities, and all the pain-pleasure phases of our life. Moreover, they provide for all

possible modes of our conduct. The human mind consequently expresses the whole world, internal and external, determined by its thinking, feeling, and will. It is evident, of course, that its expression will be as diverse as there are experiencing individuals to express themselves. But, with all its diversity, expression must be governed by some laws, natural or conventional, in order to be an effectual means of communication. As all possible impressions, external and internal, must fall either into the class of thinking or into that of feeling, let us examine the means which the individual can use to express his thought and feeling, in order to communicate them intelligently to his fellow-beings.

To express his thought, he uses speech, language. Before going any further in the analysis of the various modes of expression, I wish to emphasize the fact that this analytic separation of the factors in human consciousness is only arbitrary, to facilitate our discussion. In reality this separation is impossible. When we say that language serves for the expression and communication of *thought*, the statement must not be misinterpreted to mean that language cannot, and does not, also express feeling and will. Thought, in the human mind, does not exist without its corresponding feeling-tone; and, on the other hand, feeling or will may be communicated in such a manner that conveying thought is the ultimate purpose of the expression. "Language or speech is the means to express thought" does not mean anything but that with the aid of speech the individual is revealing and communicating a state of mind in which thought is predominant and feeling appears only as a secondary factor. It is evident that feeling must be present, for without it, as already shown, no expression would be possible. The expression of thought has the most definite aim; it is also the most objective in its result, *i. e.*, information. In order to express his thought, the individual must be precise and definite in his communication. The character of language itself shows us how adequate it is to express thought. By common consent every word has its proper and well-defined meaning. It is stripped of all other characteristics of the human mind, and conveys only thought. There is no sign of the predominance of feeling in a word. Even the words which are symbols of a certain kind of feeling inform us of that state of

mind through knowledge, not through feeling. Any further investigation of the faculty of thinking, or of its medium of expression, would lead us to the inquiry into the fundamental principles of knowledge.

The expression of feeling can be divided into two classes, according to the purpose of its communication.

1. If the purpose is to convey knowledge of the feeling expressed, the same principles will hold good as govern the expression of thought. We shall make use of speech, signs, and actions, natural and conventional. In expressing feeling in this manner we impart the knowledge of the respective feeling, not the feeling itself. In telling of my tired feeling, I propose only to convey to my audience the knowledge that I am feeling it, not to make them too feel tired. By using natural or conventional signs to express that I am hurt, my fellow-beings will gain knowledge of my pain, but will not feel the same pain themselves. Or if in my anger I do violence to some one, my feeling thus expressed will become known to others, but they will not feel the anger that I feel.

2. There might be the purpose, in my expressing certain feelings, to arouse the same feelings in my listeners. In a case of this kind, the mode of expression will be entirely different. Feeling itself being purely personal and subjective, cannot be defined and expressed in words or conventional signs and actions; it has to be generated in each individual separately in order to be felt. To awaken in others feeling similar to his own, a human mind will have to express itself in such a way as to generate that feeling in the others. The individual will express his feeling, not by conveying the knowledge that he has the feeling, but by reproducing or creating the impression, fact, or circumstance which aroused the feeling in him. Only in this way will it be possible for others to feel what the expressing individual feels. In this reproductive or recreative activity of the human mind, we find the first important clue upon which we may safely proceed toward the solution of the problem of art. At the first glance, one question forces itself upon us obviously pertinent:—Have all expressions and communications of feeling the same purpose, namely, to awaken the same or similar feelings in

others? Or, in other words, does the individual express and communicate his feelings for the sole purpose of awakening the same or similar feelings in his fellowmen? To answer this question, we have to submit feeling to a closer, more thorough examination.

## II.

### FEELING ANALYZED: ITS PROPERTIES; CLASSIFICATION.

As feeling is the special quality of the embodied mind, it is evident that every human activity, internal and external, must contain a certain feeling-tone. The seemingly purest physiological activity has its corresponding feeling-tone, because it requires life in the body; on the other hand, our seemingly purest thought is not the activity of pure intelligence, but that of an embodied (*i. e.*, a limited) intelligence; limited intelligence, as we saw, must necessarily feel.

The whole realm of feeling in its endless multiplicity and variety contains one universal trait, that of "pain-indifference-pleasure." There is no feeling in human consciousness which cannot be identified with either pain, indifference, or pleasure. The different existing theories on the subject of "pain-indifference-pleasure," or, for brevity's sake, "pain-pleasure," give us much valuable information about the psychological and physiological characteristics of the same, but on the whole we cannot be satisfied with any of these theories, because they try to separate the mental and the physical in order to find what "pain-pleasure" is. The fact is, pain-pleasure is the simplest form of feeling, and must be defined as feeling itself. While feeling is the collective name of the various kinds of pain-pleasure, pain-pleasure is the mode through which the human mind becomes conscious of its feeling. Though the simplest form of feeling, pain-pleasure can never appear as a simple element of consciousness; for every human mind is complex, and each element of this complex activity must contain a certain feeling-tone.

As feeling in general is the characteristic property of limited intelligence, and pain-pleasure is the consciousness of feeling.

pain-pleasure must be the consciousness of our limitation. The "indifference" phase of pain-pleasure is the most common in human consciousness. It appears when intelligence is normally limited in the individual. By normally limited I mean, when the organs and faculties of the individual (physical and mental) are in a perfectly natural condition and in the usual working order. But the indifference phase of pain-pleasure may also appear in consciousness when the individual is not normally limited, or not in the normal condition. In that case the human mind itself has brought about a condition which, though originally abnormal, became normal for the constitution of the individual. For example, frequent pains or pleasures may become indifferent, if by habit they become the normal condition of the individual.

Besides the normal condition, or normally limited condition, the human mind becomes conscious of conditions which are either above or below the degree of his normal limitation. By conditions "above the degree of normal limitation," I mean those in which the organism and faculties (physical and mental) are more efficient than in the normal. On the other hand, the individual is in a condition "below the degree of normal limitation," when his organism and faculties are less efficient than in the normal. The conditions "above" and "below" the degree of normal limitation appear in the individual's consciousness as pleasure and pain, respectively. Pleasure will be experienced by the individual in every case when he is conscious that his condition is above the degree of normal limitation. This means that pleasure occupies consciousness whenever the activities of the individual (mental, physical, or both) are those of organism and faculties more efficient than in his normal condition. On the other hand, pain will be experienced in every instance where the individual is conscious that his condition is below the degree of normal limitation. In other words, pain will occupy consciousness whenever the activities of the individual (mental, physical, or both) are those of faculties and organism less efficient than in his normal condition.

We must note that the efficiency and inefficiency of the organism and faculties can be either absolute or relative. In some cases, the organism and the faculties of the individual are

actually more or less efficient than they are in his normal condition; this is the absolute efficiency or inefficiency. In other cases, the organism and the faculties only seemed more or less efficient to the individual himself; this is the relative efficiency or inefficiency. Activities of the organism or faculties stimulated beyond their capacities will bring about a state of mind where the organism or faculties will appear as less efficient (relative inefficiency), and consequently the individual will experience pain. On the other hand, activities of the organism or faculties stimulated according to their capacities will bring about a state of mind where the organism or faculties will appear as more efficient (relative efficiency), and consequently the individual will experience pleasure. We can say, then, that the individual will experience pleasure in every case when he is conscious that his condition is above the degree of his normal limitation, absolutely or relatively. Pain will be experienced by the individual in every case when he is conscious that his condition is below the degree of his normal limitation. Activities which are hindering the functions of our organism and faculties are invariably painful; those which enhance them are always pleasurable.

It must be understood that I do not mean that the individual first finds out that he is normally limited, or limited above or below the degree of his normal condition, and then feels indifference, pleasure or pain; or that the individual, after experiencing indifference, pleasure, or pain, will find out that he is normally limited, or in a condition above or below the degree of his normal limitation. I mean that the individual, in any of his experiences or activities, "feels"; and consequently is conscious, in that manner, of his normal limitation or of his condition as being above or below the degree of his normal limitation.

We cannot be satisfied with knowing that the experience of the human mind is a complex, containing mental and physical elements; but as it is the experience of the human mind, we must look for an element in the experience which is the contribution of the human mind as such, *i. e.*, as a union of mind and body. We shall find, accordingly, that, besides the elements of pure reason and the physical elements, every experience of the human mind will contain an element which is the contribution of limited



intelligence. This element is the "feeling-tone" of the experience. It contains all the possible kinds of indifference, pain, and pleasure, and also all their possible combinations. The elements of limited intelligence, pain-pleasure (including indifference), may appear together in consciousness, according to the complexity of the experience. Pain and pleasure do not exclude one another, and their appearance in consciousness is entirely dependent upon the condition of the experiencing individual. The same experience may be pleasurable, painful, or indifferent, according to the state of our limitation. Even pleasure may become painful, and pain may be changed into pleasurable experience.

Feelings in general have two important properties. They are (1) intensity, and (2) duration. The intensity of pain-pleasure is the absolute consciousness of the different degrees of our limitation, below or above the natural condition. It is related directly to the degree of limitation. Pleasure will gain in intensity in the same measure as our condition appears in consciousness in the degree above the normal limitation. All of our experiences that do not appear in our consciousness as either above or below the normal condition, are identified with an indifferent feeling-tone.

The duration of pain-pleasure is the particular consciousness of the relation between our normal condition and the different degrees of limitation above or below the normal. In other words, the duration is the consciousness of our normal condition during the experience of pleasure or pain; it is related inversely to the degree of limitation above or below our normal condition. If the limitation above or below the normal condition appears in consciousness in a higher degree, the consciousness of normal limitation will be of shorter duration, and *vice versa*. But we saw that the consciousness of the different degrees of limitation above or below the normal condition is the intensity of pleasure and pain respectively; hence it follows that the duration of pain-pleasure stands in an inverse relation to its intensity. The more intense the feeling, the shorter is its duration; and the longer the duration of the feeling, the more it loses its intensity. It is evident that both properties, intensity and duration, must be present in every experience of the pain-pleasure phase; for we

can only discriminate between the above or below by being conscious of our normal limitation.

Very intense pain-pleasure must necessarily be of very short duration, but if the stimulus is kept up, and the intense pain-pleasure lasts for a longer period, the mind itself will shift the stage of normal condition closer to the degree above or below the normal, and will thus lessen the intensity. In other words, pain-pleasure of a prolonged duration must lose its intensity. Pain-pleasure phases which we experience continuously are of incessant duration, and must consequently be of the least intensity, or of none at all. Hence all continuous activities of the human mind possess a feeling-tone of indifference.

The intensity and duration of pain-pleasure are widely different from the same qualities of sensation. The intensity of a sensation depends upon the intensity of the stimulus, while the intensity of the feeling depends entirely upon the condition of the experiencing individual; for example, when listening to soft music, looking at subdued coloring, etc. In these experiences the intensity of the actual sensation is of a low degree on account of the low intensity of the stimuli; but the intensity of their feeling-tone may be very high, owing to the condition of the experiencing person. Further, the duration of a sensation depends upon the duration of the stimulus, while the duration of a feeling is independent of that of sensation: we may retain our feeling, though the actual sensation is over. One and the same experience may give us pleasure, but the duration of the pleasure is not dependent upon the duration of the stimulus; for it is possible that the same experience may become indifferent, or even painful.

We have said that pain-pleasure is the simplest form of feeling. Our next step must be the analysis of the more complex forms of feeling. The faculty of feeling, like the faculty of thinking, is ever active in the life of the human being. And all the activities of the faculty of feeling are likewise largely determined by the elements of which human nature is the union, *i. e.*, mind and body. This similarity between the faculties of feeling and thinking strongly hints that we should look for an analogy in the more complex forms and further development of the two faculties.

The development of our faculty of thinking, from its lowest form of sensation up to the highest form of thought, is the result of the different degrees of the mental and physical elements which together make up our thinking and its contents. Sensation is an activity of thinking in which the physical element is preponderant. By the addition of the mental element, sensation develops into perception and cognition. On a still higher plane, thinking becomes purely logical, and this activity contains the minimum of the physical element. Like every other activity of the human mind, sensation, perception, and cognition are inseparable, and form a continuum in human experience.

If we turn now to the faculty of feeling, we shall find that the development of it is due to the same causes as the development in the faculty of thinking. Accordingly, the first stage of feeling will be of a kind in which the intellectual element is at its minimum, the minimum in this case meaning at least as much of the intellectual element as is required for the feeling to enter consciousness; for example, a cut, inflicted on a person with a sharp instrument so swiftly that the stroke is unnoticed. The person will not discriminate any pain until his experience enters his consciousness; after this occurs he will notice the difference between his present and his normal condition. This will result in his becoming conscious of the simplest form of feeling; pain, in this instance. If for any reason the fact of his being cut does not enter his consciousness at all, he will not feel any pain either. This certainly does not mean that *feeling* is not present, for feeling must be present in every activity of the human mind; it means simply, that the feeling present is that of indifference. The greatest part of our organic activities are of the kind that do not enter consciousness, and consequently are accompanied by a feeling-tone of indifference.

If by some means we force those activities into consciousness, the feeling-tone will immediately appear. If the activities are in a condition below the normal, we shall experience pain; if they are in a condition above the normal, we shall experience pleasure. For example, the feeling-tone of our pulmonary activities. If we force our act of breathing to enter consciousness, we shall find that we feel indifferent when our breathing is in

normal condition, under normal circumstances. But in a badly ventilated room our breathing organ, even if in its normal condition, will be hindered in its action, and we shall become conscious of a painful feeling-tone. On the other hand, in a forest, where the abundance of oxygen enhances our breathing, and the action appears in consciousness as above the normal, we shall experience pleasure. This is true in all cases of our organic activities. All these feeling-tones are, however, very vague and general, and never rise above the mere consciousness of pain-pleasure.

But the human mind cannot stop at this stage of its experience; and just as it develops sensation into perception and knowledge, so by adding its mental elements to the experience of feeling, it will lift pain-pleasure into a higher stage of development. It comes about that the vague consciousness of pain-pleasure gets clearer and more definite. The pain-pleasure will be discriminated, classified, and localized. The mind will take cognizance not only of the simple pain-pleasure, but will establish the "kind" of it. That the qualitative discrimination and the localization of pain-pleasure is referred to the mental elements, is sufficiently proved by the well-known fact that, in case of an amputation, the pain is referred to the amputated part. Feelings of this class are correspondent with perception and cognition. They are the most frequent in the individual's experience. They appear as the feeling-tones of our various physical processes, and of our perceptions and cognitions. The feeling-tones of our still higher mental activities are also of a higher order, and necessarily; for in all these activities the mental element is *ipso facto* predominant. It must be understood that, by feeling of a higher or a lower order, we do not mean feeling more or less intense. All feelings, whether of a higher or a lower order, may appear in consciousness more or less intensely. We discriminate our feelings as being of higher or lower order, according to the degree of the mental element they contain.

The entire field of feelings (tactual sensation, which is commonly called "feeling" is of course here excluded) fall into two classes: bodily feelings, and mental feelings. Bodily feelings are all feelings that accompany our physiological

processes and all other activities in which the physical element is predominant. Feelings of this class are the feeling-tones of respiration, muscle movements, nerve and tissue excitations, sense activities and the physiological processes conjoined with our thinking itself. Mental feelings are those which accompany our mental activities proper. Feelings of this kind are the feeling-tones of memory, imagination, association, reflection, reasoning, etc. But though we can discriminate between bodily and mental feelings, we cannot draw a sharp line between them, because the transition from the one class to the other is a continuous one, owing to the nature of the mind itself. Nevertheless, we promptly notice the difference between the feeling-tone of thirst, of hunger, or of having a warm bath, and the feeling-tone of remorse, of friendship, or of charity. The difference as to their bodily or intellectual nature is manifest.

We can carry the analogy between the faculties of thinking and feeling still further. The human mind, by virtue of its intelligence, is not satisfied with the lowest stages of knowledge. It seeks to *understand*; and it does not rest until it attains the highest possible stage of knowledge, in the form of the true. The same tendency is manifest in all the activities prompted by the faculty of feeling. To satisfy our intelligence through the faculty of thinking, we have to be educated and taught to understand our own experiences and the expressed and communicated ideas of others. To satisfy our intelligence, when in a feeling state of mind, we also have to be taught to understand our own feeling, and the communicated feelings of others. Our intelligence will not be satisfied until our feeling, passing through its intermediate stages, arrives at its highest stage, the beautiful.

But to return to the consideration of feeling: All feelings, bodily and mental, may be characterized as possessing intensity and duration according to the intensity and duration of the pleasure or pain with which they can be connected. The properties of intensity and duration, through their immediate action upon pain-pleasure, will also modify the feeling proper, which in fact is a certain kind of pain-pleasure. In order that we may become conscious of a feeling, it is necessary that

it should have a certain degree of intensity. Feeling-tones of our continuous activities, which are of permanent duration and consequently of the lowest possible intensity, do not enter consciousness distinctly, and if they enter at all, they will be immediately forced out by feeling-tones of higher intensities. Abnormally intense feelings, on the other hand, will destroy consciousness. Feelings with intensity and duration between these two extremes will enter consciousness, and will become an active factor in it. If our feeling, thus entering consciousness, is not intense enough to occupy the predominant place, the other factors will gradually lessen its intensity, until it finally is forced out of consciousness. Feelings, if sufficiently intense to occupy the predominant place in consciousness, will determine the whole state of mind. Even if the mere discrimination of pain-pleasure, the lowest stage of feeling, enters consciousness intensely enough to be predominant, it will force the mind to look for the kind of that pain-pleasure. Thus the mind will learn that the experienced pain-pleasure manifests itself in either a bodily or an intellectual feeling.

According to the character of the experienced feeling, actions and reactions will take place in the individual, determined by feeling that occupies the center of consciousness. Feelings of this intensity will force the individual to outward expression. The expression can take place by simple muscle movement, by the movement of a part of the body, or by voluntary actions. The mode of the expression is dependent upon the character of the feeling. Feeling of high intensity will be followed by expression quickly following it. Besides, owing to the quickness with which it appears, the expression cannot enter consciousness before it is actual. It will be unconscious and uncontrollable. Expressions of this kind are "reflex movements." The highly intense feeling-tone of an exceedingly bright light (flashlight or glaring sunlight) will result in the reflex movements of the nerves and muscles of the eye and eyelid. Other examples are the sudden report of a gun, the sudden taste of anything violently bitter, sour, or sweet; or, at times, the sound of music in a ballroom, starting an instinctive movement to dance. Feelings, bodily and mental, which are not too intense,

but still intense enough to prompt outward expression, will result in actions of a different character. These actions will not follow the feeling quickly enough to prevent their being conscious actions. They will always be conscious, and their promptness and their duration will be determined by the intensity of the feeling. Bodily feelings sufficiently intense for outward expression will appear as "impulse actions." Impulsive actions are always conscious, and are uncontrollable or controllable, according to the intensity and duration of the feeling. Feelings of short duration are followed by uncontrollable impulsive acts, on account of the high intensity of the feeling. Feelings of longer duration are naturally less intense, and admit of more of the intellectual element; thus their expression will be impulsive, but controllable. Controllable impulsive actions will follow the feeling at a considerably longer interval than either the uncontrollable impulsive acts or the reflex movements. For this reason it is possible for the intellect to control, modify, or entirely inhibit the impulsive acts. Impulsive actions tend to an end, known to the individual. That end, in the region of feeling, is the annihilating or checking of pain, and the enhancing of pleasure. For illustration, take the bodily feeling of hunger: after the feeling of hunger has occupied the center of consciousness, it may become intense enough to bring on impulsive action. The end of the impulsive act is known to the individual, and the control of the act will depend upon the intensity of the feeling and, consequently, upon its duration. If the feeling is moderately intense, and of longer duration, it will admit mental activity in the form of thought, and the impulsive act becomes controllable; whereas, if the feeling is more intense and of briefer duration, the person will act even unreasonably, in order to attain the end to which the impulsive action tends, *i.e.*, to stop or to check the pain—in the special case we considered just above, to satisfy his hunger. Bodily feelings of a pleasurable character operate in the same manner, but they tend to a different end.

Mental feelings, if intense enough, will also result in outward expressions. The character of the expression will be dependent upon the character of the mental feeling. If the feeling-tone of my mental activity manifests itself in a very intense pain-pleas-



ure, the expression of it will appear as "reflex movements," on account of the quick succession of the reaction. Feeling-tones of mental activities that have previous experiences for their contents (in memory or imagination), will bring on the same kind of expressions as bodily feelings do. The outward expression of the feeling-tone of an imagined or remembered experience is identical with the expression of the feeling-tone of the actual experience, and is determined by the intensity of the memory or the imagination. It is evident that the feeling-tone of an imagined or recalled experience is quite independent of the actual experience. The identity will be found only in the modes of outward expression. According to this principle, the expression of feelings intense enough, which arise through the mental representation of some previous experience (as all our bodily feelings do), will be identical in their expression with the expression of the actually experienced bodily feelings. As we saw before, these expressions are "impulsive actions," actions tending to accomplish a purpose or end known to the individual. But there are thoughts and ideas of the human mind which are not memories or imaginations of any actual experience, and which yet also have their corresponding feeling-tones, which may rise to the predominant place in consciousness through their intensity. As such, they also will crave for outward expression. Take for example the idea of motherly love, of moral responsibility, or of the divine or supernatural: all these ideas have their corresponding feeling-tones, which we classed among "mental feelings." If mental feelings of this kind become intense enough to come out in overt expression, they will present themselves in actions which I call "instinctive acts." These acts tend to an end that is not known to the individual. Instinctive acts are always conscious, and are controllable or uncontrollable, according to the intensity of the feeling and the possibility of mental intervention.

Before going any further in the investigation of the "impulsive" and "instinctive" feelings, we shall have to consider the inter-action of the two faculties, thinking and feeling, as this inter-action is responsible for the controlling and inhibiting of our impulsive and instinctive actions, and thus reduces them to feelings of a special kind.

## III.

## EMOTIONAL STATES—PASSIONS AND AESTHETIC EMOTIONS.

The mind of the human individual is never at rest. The elements that make up consciousness are in continual process, acting and reacting, presenting a picture of kaleidoscopic variety from moment to moment of observation or introspection. Nevertheless, in all its variety, consciousness discloses at each moment a single unitary character. This unitary character is the "state of mind" of the individual. The state of mind is determined by that factor of consciousness which is predominant at the moment of observation or introspection. We have brought our investigation down to states of mind in which feeling, either bodily or mental, occupies the center of consciousness. We have found that the feelings, reacting upon the body, will bring on actions which tend to check or annihilate pain, and to enhance or prolong pleasure. This is in accord with the general tendency of limited intelligence; namely, to destroy conditions that place the individual below the normal degree of his limitation, and to create conditions that will put him above it. We have also found that, when the feelings are of a certain intensity, they will result in actions which are not controllable. We shall now have to consider the faculty of feeling in conjunction with the faculty of thinking.

Mental activity, with its corresponding feeling-tone, is never absent from consciousness. The mental processes will also react upon the individual, in order to fulfill their tendencies. Human nature in virtue of its limited intelligence, will tend to overcome this limitation. This tendency will result in bringing about conditions which will put the individual above his normal degree of limitation. Furthermore, human intelligence will not tolerate conditions that place the individual below his normal degree of limitation. But a state below the normal degree of limitation appears in consciousness as pain, whereas a state above the normal degree of limitation is identified as pleasure; hence we can say that the human mind tends to eliminate pain from consciousness, and to foster pleasure. It is evident, then, that the faculty of thinking will work hand in hand with the faculty of feeling, so

long as there is no doubt about the end to which the two faculties tend. But there will be friction between the acts of reason and the acts of feeling, if the felt end and the known end are not identical in our consciousness. To be more definite: Our actions are influenced by feeling on the one hand and by reason on the other. Both feeling and reason tend to eliminate pain and to increase pleasure. If the actions prompted by feeling are approved by our reason, they will follow the direction of our feeling and reason. But if the actions prompted by feeling do not tend to the end which reason knows as the ultimate end, they will be counteracted by reason. The result of this action and counteraction will depend upon the influence that feeling and reason respectively exert upon the individual. If feeling is the more intense, the actions will follow its direction; if reason is the stronger, the actions will be more reasonable.

In all our actions that result from a state of mind in which bodily pain is predominant, whether prompted by feeling alone or by feeling and reason together, we shall find that in order to eliminate pain our actions are directed to bringing about conditions outside of us under which the pain will be lessened or will entirely disappear. In experiences of bodily pleasure, our actions tend to put us and keep us under the stimulus that brought the pleasurable experience about. In other words, our actions prompted either by feeling or by reason (knowing the ultimate end), for the purpose of enhancing and prolonging bodily pleasure, must bring about conditions, also outside of us, under which our desire for bodily pleasure will be satisfied. I do not need to mention any special case of bodily pain, for all of them illustrate this principle: in all our bodily pains our actions tend to regain our normal condition, and so to eliminate the pain. Examples for the pleasures may be found in the various kinds of exercises, sports, etc. There is another peculiarity that manifests itself in the satisfaction of our bodily pain-pleasure, namely, the destruction of the feeling itself that craves satisfaction. This is so because the satisfaction of bodily pain-pleasure must bring about conditions that react on our physical existence, and thus change the feeling-tone of our former experience.

Mental feelings are also subject to the principle of eliminating

pain and enhancing pleasure, but the processes of elimination and enhancement are somewhat different from those connected with the bodily feelings. In all our actions that result from a state of mind in which mental pain is predominant, our aim is to bring about conditions within us (*i. e.*, thoughts, ideas, in one word, a mental state) in which the mental pain shall be lessened or entirely disappear. In enhancing mental pleasure, we again turn within ourselves, and by mental actions form new conditions in which we can maintain or enhance our pleasurable experience. Later we shall also see that mental feelings are self-satisfying. In other words, mental feeling will not be destroyed in the satisfaction of it.

According to the principle of intensity and duration, there can be very little said about the inter-action of the faculties when feeling is of an excessive intensity. Whether the feeling is bodily or mental, it will react immediately, and will appear in reflex movement. Feelings of less intensity may or may not admit the inter-action of reason. In the latter case they result in uncontrollable impulsive or instinctive actions. In cases where the intensity of the feeling admits of the action of reason, we are confronted with volitional acts or with unactualized impulsive or instinctive feelings. The investigation of volitional acts is beyond our purpose, for it belongs to the sphere of ethics. At present, we are interested in mental states preceding volitional acts, or else in mental states in which controlled impulsive or instinctive feelings occupy the center of consciousness.

Feelings which admit of the inter-action of reason become more complex through their gain of an additional mental ingredient. This complexity will develop into a process, through the reaction of the feeling upon reason. In fact, the mental state of the individual will be characterized by a perturbation which is the result of the action and reaction of feeling and reason upon the body, on one hand, and, on the other hand, upon one another. Mental state of this kind is called "emotional state." The feeling itself that characterizes the process of perturbation is called "emotion." As emotion is a process in consciousness, we can clearly distinguish the beginning and the end of an emotional state. The process of emotion begins with the "initial feeling."

The initial feeling has to be intense enough to occupy the center of consciousness, and of sufficient duration to admit reason into consciousness. The second stage of the emotional state is the action and inter-action of the thinking and feeling faculties, and their joint influence on the individual. This process terminates again in a single unitary feeling, which either comes to expression as a voluntary act, or else keeps the center of consciousness as a feeling only.

In the last chapter we were considering feelings which accompany our mental or bodily activities, or more properly speaking, feelings which complete our experience of those activities. Let us call these "simple feelings," in contradistinction from the more complex feelings called "emotions." Simple feeling is subordinate to thought, and is merely an aspect of a certain experience in consciousness; emotion and thought are co-ordinate. Emotion also has the capability of reacting upon thought and thus determining the mental state of the individual. In Wundt's<sup>13</sup> words: "The principal difference between emotion and sense-feeling (what we termed simple feeling) is in the alteration in the train of ideas." In connection with the above considerations, the following question forces itself pertinently into our investigation:—Can, and do, all simple feelings become the initial feeling of an emotion? In other words: Do all simple feelings, even though intense enough and of long enough duration, change into emotion? For example, I feel tired or I feel thirsty at the present time, or I feel some bodily pain, as headache, or toothache: is it possible for this fatigue or thirst or pain to change into an emotion? On the other hand, notice the difference in our mental state brought about by the information that we have lost one of our friends. Everyday experience and the common use of language give us a fair hint as to the difference between the two mental states. Yet we cannot be satisfied with the suggestion of every-day experience or of the common use of language. We shall have to examine all the classes of our simple feelings in their more complex development.

Let us take bodily pain first, and see how it will act when

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<sup>13</sup> Wundt, *Lectures on Human and Animal Psychology*, tr. by Creighton and Titchener, New York, Macmillan, 1894, p. 372.

it occupies the center of consciousness. Bodily pain, being the consciousness of action by our senses (or by our general physical organism) that falls below the degree belonging to our normal condition, will tend, by reacting upon us, to activities which will put us back into our normal condition. As the proximate cause of the bodily pain is always physical, the reaction upon the pain will be directed toward removing the physical cause (outside of the individual) and tends to remove it, in order to annul the pain in his consciousness. If the pain is too intense, its intensity will be lessened automatically, by reflex movements. If the pain lasts long enough, the faculty of thinking enters consciousness, and the interaction begins. The possible relations of the thinking and feeling faculties are two: Knowledge either confirms the acts of feeling, or else battles against them according as reason finds the ultimate tendency of feeling identical with its own or not. We must not forget that while knowledge sees the ultimate end, feeling craves an immediate end. In case reason confirms the tendency of a bodily pain, it will act jointly with it; in fact, feeling will submit to the supremacy of reason. We cannot recognize an emotional state in this process, for the submission of feeling will *ipso facto* make it possible that the faculties of thought shall occupy the center of consciousness. The reaction of this mental state will certainly tend to the same end as in the case of bodily pain.

But if reason does not identify the tendency of feeling as its own, our mental state will take on a perturbed condition, which will bring about the inter-action of feeling and reason, and this will result in an emotional state. The outcome of this emotional state may conform to reason or to feeling, according to the effective power of reason, commonly called "power of will."

There is a peculiarity about the bodily pain, in both cases. Whether the bodily pain, as an initial feeling, is forced out of consciousness by reason, or whether it results in an emotional state, it will invariably be annulled and so forced out of consciousness. This will be effected by creating outside the individual conditions in which removal of the cause of the bodily pain becomes possible.

In the case of bodily pleasure, the tendency of the human

mind is to prolong and enhance this condition. This is made possible through the effort to keep under the influence of the pleasurable stimulus. The stimulus in this case is again physical, and outside the individual. If reason is able to enter the consciousness determined by bodily pleasure, we shall have through its interaction the same result as we had in the case of bodily pain. Reason will either confirm the acts of feeling, or it will not. In the latter case, we are again confronted with an emotional state, with the same result as in the emotional state in which bodily pain was the predominating factor.

Here again we have to notice that a bodily pleasure, as an initial feeling, whether it is forced out of consciousness by reason or is satisfied by physical stimuli, will itself be annulled and so forced out of consciousness.

The other class of feelings that we have to examine as initial feelings in the mental state, are those which we called "mental feelings"—feelings that accompany our mental activities. In mental feelings, whether of pain or of pleasure, I distinguished two different kinds: (1) feelings that enter consciousness upon the memory or the imagination of some past or possible sensuous experience, and (2) feelings that arise in us in conjunction with ideas which have no types, parallels, or counterparts in our sensuous life and consequently cannot be memories or imaginations of any sensuous experience. "Concrete" and "abstract" mental feelings, they may be named, respectively, to express my meaning exactly. Concrete mental feelings are the feeling-tones of the memory or the imagination of bodily feelings. As initial feelings of a mental state, they will behave in exactly the same manner as feelings do when appearing at the actual sensible experience; though to be sure, the whole process in our mental state will be imaginary, and may or may not result in outward actions. Abstract mental feelings are the feeling-tones of thoughts and ideas that cannot be sensed.

To make this conception of abstract mental feeling more clear, let us notice that all our bodily feelings are the feeling-tones of experiences within the realm of our senses; and that concrete mental feelings are also finally referable to experiences in the realm of our senses: hence the causes of all these

feelings must be formed in the physical world. But abstract mental feelings are the feeling-tones of the individual's spiritual activities; they complete in consciousness thoughts and ideas that cannot be sensed: hence the proximate cause of these feelings can be found only in the spiritual element of the person. In the case of the bodily feelings and the concrete mental feelings, our mind must seek knowledge and further information about them outside of itself, while in that of the abstract mental feelings, it must seek the desired knowledge and information in the feelings themselves. To illustrate: Severe toothache, the painful feeling-tone of the loud report of a gun or the looking at too intense a light, the painful experience of thirst and hunger,—the information these feelings convey to us will give us knowledge of things outside of the feelings. The same is true about the pleasure of a meal or a cigar, or the pleasure we find in walking and in games. And concrete mental feelings are memories or imaginations of similar actual sensuous facts. But examples of abstract mental feelings are the affection that exists between parent and child, the love for the fatherland, honest pride, honor, respect, and reverence (*i.e.*, religious feeling).

If our thoughts or ideas appear in consciousness by virtue of their feeling-tones and our reason cannot find any information about them in our present or past sensuous experience, then reason will sustain those feeling-tones, in order to get the desired information from the feeling itself. In this manner the inter-action of feeling and thought will bring on an emotional process. The main characteristic of this kind of emotional process is that the initial feeling cannot be destroyed; for it is the feeling-tone of the idea about which reason is seeking further knowledge. In this mental state the human mind will be directed, by virtue of the predominant abstract mental feeling, to ideas and thoughts in order to complete its knowledge about its emotional experience. Evidently, ideas and thoughts thus brought into consciousness will have feeling-tones similar to those of the abstract mental feelings about which the further information is sought. For example, I receive a telegram advising me of the arrival of my father: the initial feeling in my mental state will be the feeling-tone of the idea of the affectionate tie existing between my father



and myself; the feeling-tone is a pleasurable one, and when this pleasurable feeling occupies the center of my consciousness, I seek further information, which will come from thoughts about our relation, thoughts whose feeling-tones keep in perfect harmony with the initial pleasurable feeling; the result will be that my emotional process will terminate in the fulfilled emotion—joy.

Now let us not fail to note that after the emotion of joy occupies the center of consciousness, the activity of the human mind is far from being at a standstill. The mind starts anew, and regards joy as a single unitary element in consciousness. On the other hand, in the case of my receiving word of the death of a friend, the principle of the interactivity of the faculties of feeling and reason is the same: the feeling-tone in this instance being painful, the emotional process will terminate in sorrow. In both these examples we also notice that the initial feeling of the emotional process is not annihilated but, on the contrary, the ideas awakened by the initial feeling are of such a nature that their feeling-tone, being harmonious with the initial feeling, prolongs this, and helps it to keep the center of consciousness. Thus the whole emotional process, with its termination, takes the character of the initial feeling. In other words, abstract mental feelings are capable of developing into emotions of their own kind, while bodily feelings and concrete mental feelings are incapable of determining the whole emotional state, and cannot be initiatory of an emotion of their own kind. When I use the expression "emotion of their own kind," I mean an emotion in which the initial feeling is not annihilated, but is preserved and fulfilled.

Another complication may occur in the emotional state, namely, when the inter-action of reason manifests itself through the feeling-tone of the thoughts and ideas; for example, the case of an individual who craves drink, and at the same time feels ashamed of the consequences of his drinking: his bodily feeling will prompt him to drink, the intellectual feeling (abstract mental), rising to an emotion of its own kind, becomes a unitary single element in consciousness, set up against the bodily feeling; the result of this mental state depends upon the comparative intensity of the bodily feeling and the abstract mental feeling. From this it follows that any bodily feeling may act as primary feeling of

an emotion (though not of its own kind), provided it is not more intense than the abstract mental feeling through which reason manifests itself in the mental state. The primary feelings least unfit to end in emotions are the memories or imaginations of bodily feelings, *i. e.*, concrete mental feelings.

In looking back, now, we cannot but notice the two different kind of emotional states which may arise from the different kinds of simple feelings, when these serve as initial feelings of the emotions. In the class of emotions that arise from bodily feelings and from concrete mental feelings, the equilibrium of the mental state will be restored by annihilating the initial feeling itself; in emotions resulting from abstract mental feelings as initial feelings, it will be restored only by the initial feeling itself remaining as a predominant factor in consciousness. Emotions of the former class are "passions," and can be reduced to impulsive feelings. Emotions of the latter class are "aesthetic emotions," and can be reduced to instinctive feelings.

#### IV.

##### IMPULSES AND INSTINCTS.

The terms "impulsive" and "instinctive" serve to designate feelings which prompt the individual to activities tending, respectively, to an end known or to an end not known. Impulses tend to an end known; instincts tend to an end not known. I am using the words "impulse" and "instinct" in the sense that they include both instinctive and impulsive actions and instinctive and impulsive feelings. I purposely use the expression "an end not known" instead of "an end unknown," to mark an important distinction. The term "unknown," usually taken to mean "unknowable," draws a line in the individual's capability of knowledge, and by using it we should commit the error of having two worlds—a known, therefore knowable, and an unknown, assumed to be unknowable. On the contrary, the terms "known" and "not known," designating the difference between impulse and instinct, admit the possibility of knowing the end of an instinctive tendency at its recurrence in our experience. Accordingly, by using those terms we shall not break the continuity of

the human mind. It is evident that if a person learns the end to which an instinctive feeling tends, this same feeling will at its recurrence change to an impulse, for the end of its tendency will be known by the individual. But if the person has not the intellectual power to learn the end of his instinctive feeling, this feeling, when it recurs, will of course remain instinctive. We must note that the acquired knowledge of the "end" does not come through any sensible experience; in other words, the knowledge does not come through any physical representation, but through the satisfaction of the feeling. As an example of this relation that subsists between instinct and impulse, I may mention the play-instinct and the play-impulse. Children will play in order to relieve their stored-up, superfluous energy, with no end *in view*, simply *feeling* the end. In this case they are prompted by the play-*instinct*. Grown people will also play, but with some definite end *in view*, recreation, exercise, etc. This play is the result of the play-*impulse*. But these considerations do not yet give us the definition of instinct, and they by no means explain the connection between instinct and the human mind.

Let us now examine the prevalent theories of instinct, in the light of the principle which I adopt in this paper. There are two main principles to which all these current theories can be reduced:<sup>14</sup> the principle of "natural selection," and the principle of "lapsed intelligence." The defenders of natural selection base their views upon the principle of evolution, and maintain that acts which proved beneficial to the race become instinctive by heredity and the survival of those fittest to environment. The adherents of lapsed intelligence say that by repeated action to satisfy a need at first conscious, the action became habitual and then automatic, and as such was transmitted by heredity. Both parties, as we see, leave feeling entirely out of the question. Further, we cannot find in either party the recognition of any inherent relation between instinct and the individual human mind. The causal factor, according to both of the two principles cited, is outside of the individual, so that the human mind, *as such*, (*i.e.*, taken *generically*, *racially*), has really nothing to

<sup>14</sup> Maher, *Psychology*, New York, Longmans & Green, 1902, p. 588.

do with instincts. And still the adherents of those principles all maintain that the human mind does possess instincts; or, rather, that some of the human activities are the results of instinctive feelings. Those two principles cannot seriously be even considered, in the temporal series; for they themselves presuppose activities that are instinctive. The attempt to find in the temporal series a causal definition of instinct, or to talk about the "origin" of instinct, is futile, for it implies human beings without any instinct at all. The theory of lapsed intelligence holds that human beings were at first conscious of their needs, and acted accordingly. With the aid of time, those actions became habitual and automatic. The transmission of the habitual and automatic action is effected by heredity. This transmitted habitual action is called instinct. My objections to this theory are, first, that it is incompatible with the development of humanity. It maintains that our actions necessary for the welfare of the species and the race, instead of being rational, become automatic; thus they must extinguish responsibility on the part of the individual. Secondly, the possibility of transmitting habitual and automatic activities by heredity is by no means a settled matter. Take, for instance, playing the piano. Perpetual practice will result in the habitual and automatic action of the player's hands and fingers. The end, or the need of this action is at first in his consciousness. Does the theory hold that this action became instinctive in the period of the practicing individual's life, or does it mean that it will change into instinct in the second or third generation, after it has been transmitted by heredity? Is it really conceivable that either of the two suppositions can be true? The acquired habitual and automatic use of the hands and fingers will remain such as long as the individual who acquired it lives, but his children, grandchildren, and great-grandchildren, etc., seem not to be born with any instinctive skill of hands and fingers for the piano; they have to acquire it by practice, as their master did. The defenders of this theory might argue, however, that piano-playing has nothing to do with the essential needs of the species or the race. But this argument would simply expose the vicious circle they are moving in; for what is it that decides whether an activity is or is not for the essential need of the species or the race, and therefore will

or will not ultimately become an instinct? There can be only one answer to this question: It is instinct itself.

The theory of natural selection falls into a like error, only it takes the opposite route around the vicious circle. According to it, the individual acts probably at random, not for a conscious end. The survival of the fittest will mark, so to speak, those random actions that preserve the agent and thus become habitual. After such actions have been transmitted by heredity, they become instinctive. But if we consider for a minute what is behind the actions that are responsible for survival, we shall certainly have to get back to instinct again. It is impossible to suppose that the survival of the fittest should be dependent upon merely random actions, or upon actions directed by some power outside the human mind. If this were the case, our moral order, our freedom and responsibility, would be nothing but a bubble, liable to be punctured by just such random actions, which will make the survival of the fittest mean merely the survival of those that survive, and thus be no clue to continued survival. We cannot consistently admit any theory of instinct which would imply or suggest a stage of human life without any instinct whatever. That instinctive feelings are subject to evolution and development, I admit; but they have to develop within themselves, not evolve out of something. They must *be*, to be evolved—developed; evolution cannot explain their *origin*. Who could seriously believe that there was a stage of human life in which men were void of the instinct to preserve their own existence? Is it rational to suppose that humanity, at any stage of its existence, had no social instinct—no instinctive bond that kept the family and the tribe together? And is it not perfectly reasonable to suppose that humanity always did have an instinctive fear, reverence, and obedience of a Higher Power, a supernatural Being, to whose causation they attributed the occurrence of their experiences? The human being must possess instinct in his own nature. No natural selection or lapsed intelligence can be explanatory of any instinct in the human individual; both these notions require instinctive intelligence in order to be conceivable. To find the answer to the question, “What is instinct?” we shall have to go to the human mind.

The outward *expression* of instinct, at any rate, whatever instinct itself may be, cannot be anything but an action by the individual. And the moving power of all our actions is in the faculties of our mind, however the actualization of the actions may depend on motor and muscular devices. Actions that are prompted by thought, or reason, cannot help us in our investigation of the instincts. Actions of this kind must necessarily tend to a *known* end, and *ipso facto* cannot be instinctive. Volitional acts must also be disregarded on the same ground. We can will, or choose, only if we have alternatives and know which is the best for our purpose or end. We shall therefore have to look for instinct among the actions that spring from the faculty of feeling.

In our former chapters, we found that instinctive actions are the results of abstract mental feelings which are sufficiently intense. The question now is, How do we come to have abstract mental feelings which, if intense enough, will prompt us to instinctive actions? The human mind is a limited intelligence. The limitation manifests itself through the intermingling of our senses and our feeling with pure intelligence. Consciousness, in its actual history, is nothing but the experience of the limited condition of pure intelligence in each individual. Every experience in human consciousness is transformed into knowledge by virtue of our intelligence as a power. Our senses and the feeling-tones of our sense activities (bodily feelings and concrete mental feelings) limit pure intelligence in us as related to the physical world. Abstract mental feelings limit it in our relation to the spiritual world, or the realm of pure reason; that is to say, they limit it in its direct relation to itself.

Our senses and feelings, limiting pure intelligence, become channels by which it regains the knowledge thus limited and obscure. Imbued with the tendency to rising above its limitation, human mind will seek knowledge first in the realm of sensation, which contains the limitation of knowledge by its immediate environment. But while the individual's knowledge, at this stage, is confined to sensations, he will, in feeling, become conscious of another limitation of his intelligence. This feeling, which, in human intelligence, supplements knowledge, or, rather, which makes us conscious of what we do not know is instinct. Intelli-

gence, even in a limited condition, cannot be satisfied to know only a part of the truth and merely feel the rest. It will apply its faculty of thinking, and complete the knowledge it can gain through the senses. In consequence, the limitation of the sensible part of truth will be lifted into the sphere of complete intelligence. The same process will change the instinctively felt part of truth into knowledge. Truth being identical with pure reason or pure intelligence, it will be found in the human mind, but in a limited condition, partly as knowledge and partly as instinct. The less of the truth there is known to the human mind, the more of it will there appear in the form of instinct. Instinct is the complement to the knowledge of truth. It is evident that, in essence, there can only be one instinct. The one instinct always was, and always will remain, instinct; for the reason that truth in its entirety can be known only to pure intelligence (absolutely omniscient). Still, instinct prompts to actions which are leading humanity onward to the knowledge of that part of the truth which is represented by it. It is largely responsible for our development, our civilization, and, in short, all of our activities, that are directed toward an end not yet known by us, but nevertheless felt all along.

Though instinct is in essence only one, it may appear in innumerable variations, according to how much of the truth is known to the individual, and how much of his action is guided merely by instinct. In any case, and under any circumstances, the instinctively felt part of the truth can manifest itself in only three different ways:—

1. The individual may feel that the complemental part of truth is in himself. When feeling thus, he will be prompted to actions which chiefly concern his own person, as being the most important in question. His intellect will explain everything in the light of his private self. All his experiences, he will refer to himself. All his activities will tend toward the satisfaction of the one instinct, which in this case is the realization of the truth which he himself is. Instinct in this stage is the “instinct of self-preservation.”

2. The individual may feel that the complemental part of the truth is in the other individuals as well as in himself. This

feeling will lead him to actions concerning his fellow-men as well as himself; his intellect will now explain his experience in the light of society. He will feel that he must and ought so to act that the other selves shall be regarded as his equals. Every act of the individual will be connected with the society he lives in, and so he seeks to satisfy his feeling of the reality and the worth of the other persons. This is his realization of the reality of society, or the truth of society. This instinctive feeling is the "social instinct."

3. Finally, the individual may feel that the complemental or hidden part of the truth is not merely outside of *him*, but is also outside of his fellow-men, outside of men altogether. Whether he feels that this greater truth is nature, sun, moon, stars, the wide universe, or God, does not alter the nature of his instinct. His feeling will prompt him to regard that hidden part of truth with an awe and reverence. This instinct will make him conscious of the superiority of the whole. This is the "religious instinct."

All these phases of instinct may develop into knowledge, on the principle of the tendency of the human mind as limited intelligence. All these phases of instinct may appear in consciousness at the same time. Instincts being feelings, they do not exclude one another, though it is possible that one kind of instinct, being more intense than another, will occupy the center of consciousness, and through its predominance determine the mental state, and subsequently the acts, of the individual. For example, if the instinct of self-preservation and the social instinct appear in consciousness together, we shall act according to the respective intensities of these instincts. Our actions, to be sure, will not be deliberate and premeditated; for this can occur only if one of our instinctive feelings becomes knowledge; in that case only, do we act voluntarily. Our acts all tend to an end either known or felt, according to the principle which rules feelings universally. Acts in the realm of the instinct of self-preservation are the first to become deliberate and volitional, unless they are of extreme intensity; in that case, they become impulsive. The reason of this is, that in the human mind the different variations of the instinct of self-preservation are the earliest to become



knowledge. The social instinct is the next to be lifted into the sphere of knowledge. The religious instinct comes to be knowledge the last.

Peoples in the very first stage of human existence knew some truth, in their own way, and felt the rest. They knew, owing to their senses, that they were living, living in a world full of variety and change, continually experiencing phenomena which they could not understand. In completion of this meager knowledge, each person felt that he himself was more important than anything external around him. He felt, too, that his fellow-men ought to be treated with more consideration than the lifeless objects of nature, and even with more than the fish or game he hunted for food, or than the animals that were the companions of his daily life. Men even at this stage felt there must be something that was responsible for all the things they sensed but could not understand. They felt there must be some Power, superior to their own, that caused the changes in this world, and that ruled over the night and the day. What the probable life of those early peoples must have been, endowed with knowledge so meager and instincts so abundant, we can easily conclude. Voluntary, premeditated, or purposive actions were restricted to the sphere they knew, *i.e.*, the surrounding physical world and the welfare of the physical self (instinct had here been swiftly transformed into knowledge). Certainly their knowledge of the self was very primitive; consequently their actions in this region (which now became either impulsive or deliberate) must also have been of a primitive order. Actions pertaining to the individual's other relations to his fellow-men and to the Power above him were still instinctive, and not deliberate and purposive. Actions of this kind, moreover, will always be less frequent than those of the former kind. To arouse instinctive feelings in us, we must first have a suitable experience, whereas deliberate purposive acts we can bring about at our will. This fact is one of the main reasons why the development and progress in civilization is so slow.

Through frequent experience of the instinctive feelings, and through observation of the results of instinctive action, people will learn to know such feelings, and will be able to judge how to act, whenever they reappear. In this way humanity took a

step forward in civilization. Peoples at this stage, as just seen, know of the self, of society, and of a supreme Power; but we must not suppose that the instinct of self-preservation, or the social and the religious instinct, is abolished and corresponding action lifted entirely into the sphere of knowledge. Only some manifestations of those instincts are at any given stage changed into knowledge, while others remain in the region of feeling. At our present stage of civilization we may know a considerable amount about the preservation of the self, we may have learned how to regard the society of the other selves, we may know about a supreme Power, or first principle; but is there not a certain phase in every one of the three kinds of instinct, in which we still simply feel and do not know? How many people can say that they know all about the immortality of the soul? How many can say that they know every person in society is an independent reality? How many can assert that they know what the first principle is, or even that there *is* one? Very few, indeed. All the rest will instinctively feel these things, nevertheless. For the truth is in every individual, and it appears in consciousness partly known and partly felt. Some know more of it and feel less, others feel more of it and know less. Instinct existed in the first human being, and will exist in the last one.

The development of the instincts into knowledge must be looked upon teleologically. We have to consider the whole process in the light of the end. If an instinct developed into knowledge in some individual or species or race, that does not mean that the instinct ceased to exist; we simply have to look for it in other individuals, species, or races, whose intelligence has not yet changed it into knowledge. The whole process of development is going on simultaneously in the various phases of instinct, in the various individuals, species, or races, so that if one phase undergoes the change into knowledge another will take its place. We also have to note that though the instinct of self-preservation, in its most primitive form, will be the first to develop into knowledge, it will not exclude the possibility of a concurrent development of the mental, of the social, and the religious instinct. In other words, the instinct of self-preservation will not develop at once in its entire capacity, and the social and the religious instinct will follow.

As instincts are the complements of knowledge, they naturally must tend to the same end as intelligence, only they appear in consciousness as feelings and their end is at first known to the individual. All the actions prompted by the instinctive feelings and executed by the individual will appear in consciousness as the satisfaction of feeling and will be pleasurable, because the satisfaction of instinctive feeling puts the individual in a condition above the normal degree of his limitation. In the course of the development of instincts into knowledge, the individual will learn the end to which they tend, and will look upon the actions emanating from them as advantageous. The human mind reaches out for the advantageous, and subsequently for the pleasurable, in order to realize the tendency of its reason and its instinct. The disadvantageous is characterized in consciousness by aversion, and has a painful feeling-tone. It will be recognized in its proper character whenever our instinctive actions meet with inhibition. This naturally retards the mind in reaching its end, or rather in coming nearer to it, felt or known; so the experience will be known as disadvantageous, and felt as pain; for the individual will be conscious of his condition as being below his normal degree of limitation. It is evident that in this condition instinct and reason will tend first to regain the normal condition and then to lift the individual above his normal limitation. That is why the human mind instinctively and reasonably checks and then annihilates pain, and prolongs and enhances pleasure. The various activities of which the human mind avails itself in order to realize this purpose, we dealt with in our discussion of feelings in general.

## V.

### AESTHETIC EMOTIONS, THEIR EXPRESSION AND COMMUNICATION; AESTHETIC CATEGORIES.

In our investigation of feeling, we learned that the human being possesses feelings of a certain kind, which in their essence serve to complement his knowledge of reality. These feelings we termed abstract mental feelings, and we also found that primarily they belong to the class of instinctive feelings. Their

main characteristic, which differentiates them from all other feelings, is that they are the only feelings with the potentiality of being the initial of an emotion of their own kind. These emotions we called aesthetic emotions. According to our principle, aesthetic emotions are processes in which the initial feeling is not destroyed, but on the contrary remains predominant in consciousness during the whole process, and determines the state of mind of the individual when his mental equilibrium is restored. Aesthetic emotions, being what they are, must also be rooted in instinct. Their proximate cause cannot be found in the physical world, outside of the individual, but they belong strictly to our mental life. Aesthetic experiences are also immediate experiences, for they can appear only in connection with ideas, felt or known, without any sensible qualities whatever. In connection with this, we must note that, while the æsthetic emotion itself is always immediate, it might be brought into consciousness by any other experience, sensuous or mental. Any experience of the human mind may arouse an abstract mental feeling by association or suggestion; and this abstract mental feeling, again, may become the initial of an emotional process which will certainly be aesthetic. It may happen that the experience in question is in the domain of feeling. In that case the experienced feeling, as the primary feeling, will be forced out of the center of consciousness by the aroused mental feeling, and it too may develop into an emotional process that will be defined by the abstract mental feeling, and thus also become æsthetic.

Having ascertained the main characteristics of the aesthetic emotions, we are now ready to answer the question, What is art? Art being an activity of the human mind, it can manifest itself only through outward expression. As I suggested in the beginning of my paper, art is the expression of a certain kind of feeling. Now I can add that art is the expression of the aesthetic emotions. Expression is an essential property of the human mind as a social being. Expression as a social factor must be intelligible to the individual's fellow-men, and accordingly it serves as communication. Communication is the only way by which the members of a society can understand one another and co-operate to attain the end toward which humanity is constantly moving.

The ultimate purpose of communication cannot be anything but the end of human intelligence, namely, reason, or knowledge. We communicate our sensible experiences, and gain knowledge of the sensible experiences of others, through the channels of the different sciences. Philosophy is the medium by which we communicate and learn of things that do not belong to the realm of our senses. But we saw that the knowledge of the non-sensible things is complemented by abstract mental feelings or instincts. It is the business of art to acquaint us with those feelings which complement our knowledge of the true. Feelings that are expressed and communicated through art are either abstract mental feelings or instinctive feelings. The way in which art communicates them is by arousing in us the kind of feeling which it purports to communicate. In order to do this, art must create things in outward expression intelligible to us. These creations must also be capable of arousing in us an abstract mental feeling predominant enough to stir up an aesthetic emotion. This mental state is aesthetic contemplation, or the aesthetic state. The aesthetic state has its satisfaction in the feeling itself, or rather in the feeling-tone of the thing expressed. As the aesthetic state can be brought about only by abstract mental feelings, it can be reduced to categories, corresponding (1) to the instinct of self-preservation, (2) to the social instinct (the instinct for the preservation of society), and (3) to the religious instinct.

1. The human mind may have experiences which arouse in it the instinctive feeling of self-preservation, or the feeling-tone of the idea of self-preservation, and thus become responsible for the aesthetic state of the individual. In this aesthetic state, the individual refers the experience to himself exclusively. He regards everything as solely the object of his own experience. He feels that his self expands; he seizes the object; so to speak, puts himself into it; and for the import of his experience looks into his own reality. After the experience, a soothing, harmonious, and serene feeling comes over him, which makes him conscious of his fittest self.

2. Other experiences of the individual may arouse feelings which spring from the social instinct. Aesthetic states of this order have their roots in the felt consciousness of the relation

between the individual and the other members of human society. These emotions are of the social nature, and through them the individual realizes that other human beings are his equal and just as real as himself. In this aesthetic state the individual refers his experience to the society first, and then to himself as a member of that society. He feels and recognizes that his reality is dependent upon the reality of the society, and his instinct of self-preservation will expand to the preservation of society.

3. Lastly, the individual may have experiences which arouse in him the religious instinct. Aesthetic emotions which arise from the religious instinct are the felt consciousness of a higher reality, which in his conception may be equivalent to God, nature, sun, moon, etc.—in a word, the consciousness of the superhuman. It is the felt relation in consciousness between the individual and his superior.

The aesthetic states, being essentially feelings, share the properties of feeling in general. They do not exclude one another, and are not dependent upon certain stimuli for their appearance in consciousness. One and the same stimulus may arouse one or all of the aesthetic emotions, or it may not arouse any of them: it depends entirely upon the individual. The disappearance of the stimulus will not stop the aesthetic state.

Feelings which determine the aesthetic state are aesthetic categories. As we have discerned three aesthetic states, arising from the three instincts respectively, we shall also find three aesthetic categories. Emotions which spring from the instinct or idea of the self belong to the category of the beautiful. Social emotions, which arise from the social instinct, or from the idea of society (*κοινία*), belong to the category of the "coenopathic." Emotions brought about by the religious instinct, or by the idea of God, belong to the category of the sublime.

The following is an outline of the analysis and discussion of the "aesthetic categories," which at some future time I hope to develop in full.

#### 1. THE BEAUTIFUL.

Up to the present stage of my investigation, I have tried to keep the individual and his activities in an organic unity. And though for the sake of convenience and clearness I drew dividing

lines between the faculties of the individual when considering psychological and physiological facts, the principles derived from them I applied invariably to the human mind as an organic whole, *i. e.*, a limited intelligence. I purpose to proceed with the investigation of the beautiful in the same manner, and shall try to find the philosophical principle of what we call beautiful. To avoid ambiguities and misunderstanding, I will state in a few words my position, and explain the exact meaning of the word "beautiful," in the sense in which I am using it in this paper. The term "beautiful" serves to designate a principle; a principle which enables us to stamp any of our experiences as beautiful, provided the experience is in conformity with the principle. The terms "objective beauty" and "subjective beauty" are not adequate names for the beautiful, in the sense in which it is used in this paper. The beautiful, as a principle, overspans the objective and the subjective, and holds them in a perfect unity. As the beautiful is the outcome of the faculty of feeling, it undoubtedly must manifest itself through pain-pleasure, but is by no means either identical or synonymous with it, or equivalent to it.

Like all other principles or causes, the beautiful is not static, but dynamic. It is an activity, a process. This process terminates in a particular feeling which is commonly called the sense of the beautiful. Besides its pleasurable and painful quality, there is a decided and very pronounced feeling of satisfaction and contentment in the consciousness of the beautiful. A serene calm comes over us, and we fall into a peaceful contemplation. This calm and satisfied feeling is the most striking characteristic of the beautiful. Looking at a painting, which we find beautiful, we feel that calm and satisfaction. In our contemplation, we try to reduce our activities to the minimum, or at least we try to eliminate them from our consciousness. When listening to beautiful music, we close our eyes, and are satisfied with that calm contemplation which is so characteristic of the beautiful. The same calm and satisfaction takes possession of us when reading a beautiful poem or drama. No matter what disturbances take place in our emotions during the performance of a drama, we can easily distinguish some points (resting points, so to speak), when a serene calm comes over us, and contentment and satisfac-

tion occupy our mind. Those "resting points" are the results of the process of the beautiful. It is true that the feeling of satisfaction will appear at every activity of the faculty of feeling not inhibited in its process. But the peculiar satisfaction of the beautiful differs from all the other satisfactions of our feelings: Experiencing something beautiful, we find satisfaction in the feeling itself. We do not need to destroy it for the sake of satisfaction, and we do not need to create physical conditions in order to sustain or enhance our feeling. This is the characteristic property that differentiates the satisfaction of the beautiful from the satisfaction of the rest of our feelings. We can say that if our experience is of such nature that its feeling-tone is capable of starting a process in the faculty of feeling, and this process results in a calm, serene satisfaction without destroying the original feeling-tone, we shall experience the beautiful. The feeling-tone of our experience, not being destroyed, will co-exist with the calm, serene satisfaction; it will be further stimulated, prolonged, and enhanced, even after the stimulus of the experience is removed. This is the reason why it often occurs that in memory we keenly *feel* the beauty of an experience, when the knowledge of it may have entirely vanished from our memory.

To exemplify: When listening to a piece of music which I find beautiful, the feeling-tone which sets the principle working is not destroyed in my calm contemplation of the beautiful, but continues to exist along with my feeling of satisfaction; so much so, that I refer the beautiful to that initial feeling. If it is a melody which appeals to my feeling, the initial feeling will be the feeling-tone of the relation of sound-succession. The result of the aesthetic process will be the aesthetic satisfaction with the co-existence of the initial feeling-tone: in this case, the feeling-tone of the melody; and I will refer to my experience as a beautiful melody. We must also note that the initial feeling may be pleasurable or painful, as for instance, in light, joyful music, or in sentimental, dirge-like compositions; not solely in pleasurable, as some writers hold. And after the actual experience, the intensified feeling-tone which is the beautiful, will remain in consciousness as a memory, and will survive the memory of the knowledge of the experience. I am sure every one of us has had the experience of telling



how beautiful a certain song or musical composition was, without recollecting the name or the theme of the composition. This same principle holds true in the realm of our visual and tactual experiences. Take for example the well-known paintings of Christ. The calm, serene contemplation of their beauty will not destroy the initial feeling-tone of indignation and sorrow, but the contemplation and the feeling-tone will be adjusted. The equilibrium of our mental state will be re-established according to the principle of the beautiful, not by destroying the initial feeling, but by making it harmonize with the aesthetic satisfaction. In fact, the more intense the initial feelings appear in consciousness, the more beautiful will be the experience of the observer. In a tragedy the fall of the hero, the victims of the collision, are by no means calm, serene, or soothing; still, when we reach those "resting points" where we experience the beautiful, we do feel a calm, soothing satisfaction, in spite of our disturbed mental state. In the re-established equilibrium, our initial feeling will be in a perfect unitary harmony with the aesthetic satisfaction.

What is this aesthetic satisfaction, which is so essential in experiencing the beautiful? As this satisfaction is in the feeling itself, it cannot be anything but the end to which the feeling tends. This end, according to the conditions above established, is not *known*, but is *felt* in our consciousness. It is but logical, then, to take the next step, and look for the explanation of the aesthetic satisfaction in the region of instinct. By instinct the human mind is incited to an endless process, an activity leading to the individual's development and higher realization. This end is felt by the individual, and the initial feeling is the instinct of self-preservation. Becoming conscious of this instinct, the individual will feel that he is a single reality, though, indeed, this instinct cannot actually be separated from the social and religious instincts. The instinct of self-preservation will spur the individual to a higher development, of which he is not only the recipient object, but also the active subject: he is not merely *subjected* to this process, but becomes conscious of it and partly knows, and partly feels, the goal toward which he moves. In so far as that goal, in its known aspect, appears in his consciousness through its feeling-tone, he will experience a moment of serene quiet, as if his activities would

halt, to enable him to behold the end to which they tend. This quiet moment contains the satisfaction of feeling, and is in fact identical with aesthetic satisfaction. The beautiful, then, is the felt consciousness of the end (or goal) to which the instinct of self-preservation, blending with its idea, leads the human being. As we now clearly see, it is the result of a process. We have an experience: this may arouse in us, directly or indirectly, an abstract mental feeling intense enough to occupy the center of our consciousness; thus the emotional process begins, and it will terminate in the satisfaction of the feeling, which is simply the felt consciousness of the end to which the feeling tends. In such an aesthetic state the individual finds his highest realization, and feels the greatest import of the self. By referring his experience to himself, he makes it a part of himself—makes it as real as he feels himself to be. The experienced object and the experiencing person become united in the individual, by his investing his experience with his own reality. There can be no such thing as the object's being beautiful, or the experiencing subject's feeling the emotion of beauty, one apart from the other: the aesthetic state is the consciousness of an active principle that assimilates and unites the two. This assimilation and union, felt in consciousness, is called the beautiful.

This principle and the resulting process must be universal in mankind; for limited intelligence must by its nature have instinctive feelings, and when these appear in consciousness they must operate in the same way in every case. To arouse an aesthetic emotion, we must have an experience capable of awakening in us our instinctive feelings. This may happen in either of two ways: An experience may arouse the instinctive feeling itself, or it may express an idea that has an instinctive feeling for its feeling-tone. For example, on looking at a painting, we may feel our own completion directly in the gratification of our senses, as in a harmonious coloring or the symmetrical drawing, etc., and thus find the picture beautiful; or, on the other hand, the experience may suggest to us the skill of the artist, and so may awaken in us the idea of a more complete self than our own. This idea will certainly be accompanied by a feeling-tone, which in essence is identical with the instinctive feeling of the more

complete self, and again we find the painting beautiful. In both instances the experience may suggest or arouse in us the *felt* consciousness of the physically or mentally complete self, as the case may be. In the former case we are confronted with physical beauty; in the latter, we experience spiritual beauty. The physical beauty can be referred to our sense-activities, while spiritual beauty is the result of our mental activities. It necessarily follows that the two activities must not interfere with one another, else we lose the feeling of completeness.

The consciousness of beauty, in all cases, comes to us through the associative power of the mind. This is the same power that mind exercises in the faculty of thought, only in this case it acts in the faculty of feeling. An aesthetic experience is dependent for its beauty on this associative power, which is set in action by the intensity of the feeling-tone of the experience. The association of the feeling-tone with the felt consciousness of self-preservation in a more complete self is the aesthetic activity that results in the beautiful. The principle that governs the whole process is universal and unchangeable, and is what we mean by the beautiful.

## 2. THE COENOPATHIC.

Coenopathic feelings are feelings which arise from the social instinct of the human mind, and make the individual conscious of the relation between himself and human society. Even after the instinct has changed into an idea or into knowledge, the accompanying feeling-tone will be identical with the instinctive feeling out of which the idea developed. For example take the feeling of motherly love. In little girls, playing with their dolls, this feeling is purely instinctive. In later womanhood, when they learn to know the *idea* of motherly love, their feeling will not change in essence, though probably it will in intensity.

Coenopathic feelings are all aesthetic, for they emanate from instincts and are abstract mental feelings, with the possibility of becoming initials of an emotion without being destroyed. The coenopathic feelings are not necessarily beautiful. They become so, if the individual feels the identity of the social instinct and the instinct of self-preservation. In other words, when the individual

feels that the preservation of society is a broader conception of self-preservation, then the feelings which arise from his social instinct will also bear the stamp of the beautiful. For instance, the true friendship that binds two people to one another is not only social, but also beautiful; because we feel in the experience the expansion and the fuller completion of the self, and this feeling is the satisfaction of the instinct of self-preservation in the sense in which we expounded it in our discussion of the beautiful. On the other hand, our everyday friendship (so-called), though it is social, is far from being beautiful, because the experience of it is unable to suggest the idea or awaken the instinctive feeling of the more complete self. (This example is also a striking proof that the terms "beautiful" and "aesthetic" are not synonyms.)

Coenopathic feelings, being the felt consciousness of some relation between the self and the other members of society, are of innumerable variety. But in all there is an intrinsic characteristic: In all we relate ourselves to society, or at least to some member of society. This relation, according to the principle of the social instinct, can manifest itself as advantageous or disadvantageous. We must bear in mind that the instinct of the preservation of society tends, just by virtue of being an instinct, to the goal to which all the faculties of the human mind tend, *i.e.*, to the highest and most complete stage of human society. If any experience, then, has a feeling-tone capable of arousing in us the social instinct or the idea of the society, we shall experience an aesthetic state predominated by a certain social or coenopathic feeling having the general character of the advantageous or disadvantageous, according to whether the experience coincides with the tendency of our social instinct or is contrary to it. As we see, the principle of the coenopathic emotions, the second aesthetic category, is also dynamic. The felt consciousness of this principle manifests itself in universal love, or, in other words, the recognition by each person of all other persons as realities. Universal love is the bond that holds the individuals together in an organic society. This universal love, being the goal of the social instinct, is the source whence the coenopathic feelings arise. The process in our mental state is the same as we found it to be in the first aesthetic category, the beautiful. The aesthetic category of the

coenopathic can operate in two ways, according as the relation of which it makes us conscious conforms with the principle of universal love or is antagonistic to it. Experiences of the former type belong with the comic, while those of the latter are subsumed under the tragic. In both cases our mental state will take the form of a purgatory, so to speak, where the purging element is universal love. The feeling-tone of our experience, when it rises to an emotion, will be led through a process of purgation, and will be felt as reconciled with the universal love, or the instinct to preserve society. In the comic the purgation will be effected by the correction of social conditions apparently hostile to the realization of universal love. In the tragic the purgation will be the result of a conflict in which forces antagonistic to the principle of universal love are ultimately defeated. The comic and the tragic are of course subject to subdivision, the exposition of which will be undertaken in a paper dealing exclusively with the aesthetic categories.

Suffice it here to mention the most important of the subdivisions of the tragic, namely, the pathetic, which is the connecting link between the coenopathic and the sublime. The pathetic because it represents undeserved and inexplicable disaster, leaves no solution for the mystery of seeming injustice other than faith in the superhuman on the one hand and, on the other, joy in the beauty of submission for the sake of others. The pathetic is that phase of the tragic in which justice ceases to explain, and reason abdicates in favor of the unfailing, redemptive, and heroic quality of love. In the pathetic therefore the coenopathic emotions pass into the sublime.

### 3. THE SUBLIME.

The aesthetic category of the sublime springs from our religious instinct, and is the felt consciousness of a superior, higher power, without the fear of its destroying our self. In the sublime we become conscious of our self in the light of the absolute. It is not only the felt consciousness of the end to which our instinct of self-preservation tends, but it is the felt consciousness of the unattainable. It is the felt relation between the individual, as limited intelligence, and the absolute intelligence. The principle of the sublime is to be found in the reconciliation

of the religious instinct and the instinct of self-preservation. That this is so, can easily be seen when we consider the different feelings which, united in a perfect harmony, result in the consciousness of the sublime. It is beyond dispute, that whenever we are conscious of the sublime we also experience the beautiful. But it is also true that the feeling of awe and reverence is present as well as that of the beautiful, and determines the character of the mental state. It follows, then that the feeling of awe and reverence, which is not destroyed, and is capable of determining an emotion, is an abstract mental feeling and has its root in an instinct—in this case, the religious instinct. In fact, the process of the sublime can be described as follows:

Some suitable experience awakens in us the religious instinct, and we become filled with awe and reverence. The insignificance of our own being coincidently suggests the idea and awakens the instinct of self-preservation; thus, in addition to the feeling of awe and reverence, we experience that of the beautiful. In the reconciliation and unification of the two feelings, we lose the feeling of fear and become conscious that, even in our insignificance, we are of nearer kin to the Absolute and we feel a realization of His essence in our own. As the beautiful, one of the elements in the sublime, may appear as physical beauty or as mental, it will determine correspondingly the character of the sublime. Experiences of the sublime in which our senses take precedence are "material"; whereas those that come to us through our mental activity are "spiritual." As examples I may mention the Falls of Niagara, the Yosemite Valley, the Yellowstone Park, Händel's "Messiah," or Berlioz's "Requiem" rendered by an orchestra of one hundred and twenty and a chorus of two hundred; all these belong to the material sublime. The great pictures of the Madonna, paintings of the suffering Christ on his way to Calvary, the drama of the Crucifixion, and Wagner's "Parsifal," belong to the spiritual sublime.

The three aesthetic categories, the beautiful, the coenopathic, and the sublime, founding essentially on instincts, cannot exclude one another. And on the other hand, belonging to the faculty of feeling, they do not depend for their rise upon specific outward stimulus. One and the same experience may bring about the

operation either of any one of the aesthetic categories, or of all three. Their rise into consciousness depends entirely upon the state of the individual who has the experience. The beautiful, being the realization of the instinct or the idea of self-preservation, is the most widely known and most commonly felt aesthetic experience. In the form of material beauty, it is the felt consciousness of the simplest relation existing between the self and its experience; this form of it appears in every stage of the life of mankind. Spiritual beauty requires a more advanced stage of development, on account of the predominance in it of the mental activity. Most of our experiences of spiritual beauty belong to the coenopathic feelings also, for the instinct to preserve society is but a fuller and higher expression of the instinct of self-preservation. The experience of the sublime requires a still higher stage of development. It is necessary that the individual should have risen to a state in which he is able to recognize in the first principle of the universe something akin to his own nature, something which is absolutely identical with the end to which his whole being, intelligence as limited and yet inextinguishably active, forever tends.

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#### AUTHOR'S NOTE.

My endeavor in the present paper has been to elucidate the fundamental principles which in my opinion will serve as a sound basis for a system of the philosophy of art. I have confined myself to giving here a merely tentative outline of the theory, which I hope in the not too remote future, to complete.

I wish to express my thanks to Professors Gayley and Howison and Dr. Wrinch for the help they have all extended to me during my studies. Especially am I thankful to Professor Gayley for his encouragement of my work.

ARTHUR WEISS.

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